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Kim Dae Jung, 23 Democrats Tortured

South Korea's leading opposition politician, Kim Dae Jung, testified he had been questioned 15 hours a day for two months and driven "to the very point short of torture" by the military investigators.

"It is beyond description how I suffered mentally," Kim told the five army officers making up the panel at his trial on the defense ministry compound. "Sometimes, I was stripped naked. . . and driven to the very point of torture."

"I have a weak heart and the situation was too much for me to stand," he said.

"I was extremely tired, mentally as well as physically, so I signed some statements against my will, thinking I could deny them in court."

The Aug. 25, 1980 issue of American weekly magazine "Newsweek" said: Relatives of the defendants were not allowed to visit them until a few days before the trial opened. Then the authorities granted only ten-minute visits. Kim's wife found the normally plump dissident leader looking worn and thin. "He looks very depressed," she said. "My heart is aching." Relatives of some of Chon's other political prisoners said the captives had been tortured into making false confessions. Prof. Li Mun Yong had been beaten severely and was unable to raise one of his arms. Some of the prisoners were kept in a windowless cell about 25 feet square for as long as eighteen days. The cell had a 300-watt electric lamp that burned day and night; food and water were passed in through two minuscule openings.

On the third day of his trial on charges of instigating the overthrow of the government and violating south Korea's law against leading an "anti-state" organization, charges that could bring a death penalty, Kim also said he had signed some statements unwillingly and would deny them in court.

Kim denied ordering a student named Chong Dong Nyun to launch an uprising in Kwangju, a southern city where over 2,000 people were killed in May during a week-long uprising. The demonstration occurred after the imposition of full martial law and Kim's arrest.

"It's a lie, it's a fabrication," Kim said. "I haven't met him. I don't know him," he said, gesturing emphatically.

Earlier a prosecutor asked Kim if he had said democracy must be won by the "blood of the people." He replied that he had merely quoted U.S. statesman Thomas Jefferson who said democracy must be nurtured by the blood of tyrants.

"I have never thought of resorting to violence as a means of seizing power," said Kim, who is accused of plotting and fomenting violent student demonstrations last May. "My thinking always was to come to power through elections.

"I told them all the truth but the military investigators never tried to believe me. They told me it would be better for me to admit all (the charges) now because I would have an opportunity to deny them in court."

The prosecution contended that Kim planned to create campus unrest and cause riots to topple the government.

"It is not true," Kim said. "I thought the situation could be dealt with only by public opinion, not by violence."

Three leading dissidents also on Aug. 20 denied the prosecution charges that they had plotted with one-time opposition presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung to overthrow the military-based south Korean government.

"I did not do that," Ye Chun Ho, a former opposition politician, said, denying the prosecution charges that he plotted with other defendants to topple the government through a popular uprising or student demonstrations.

"If I had used students for such a purpose, I would have to accept a death sentence," the 52-year-old opposition politician said.

Former college law professor Li Mun Yong, 53, and dissident poet Ko Un Tae, 47, also denied that they were involved in the alleged plot to bring down the government through violence.

The dissident professor told the military court that Kim Dae Jung never plotted to topple the government to seize power.

He asserted that their collaboration within the organization named the National Union for Democracy was aimed at launching a movement for restoring democracy to the country.

The prosecutor asked him whether he thought anti-government student demonstrations in May would create a favorable situation for Kim to take over power. Li replied flatly: "I never thought of that."

On Aug. 19, Kim Dae Jung refused to answer questions in his trial, saying the court proceedings amounted to "political repression."

Kim spoke in a soft voice during his brief comments criticizing the trial and was allowed to remain seated on a hard wooden bench in the court room because he was reportedly suffering from weakness in his legs.

"I have nothing against the judges' panel nor against the prosecutors," Kim said. "I refuse to answer questions because this trial amounts to political repression."

"I was rehabilitated and received an amnesty from conviction under emergency decrees, and I therefore refuse to be tried (on the same charges).

The prosecutors asked him a series of questions about alleged procommunist activities when he was in his 20's and about his connection with an organization of Korean residents in Japan that has been called "anti-state."

After a brief recess which he asked for his defense counsels, Kim denied the Japan-based group was anti-state, and stressed that he had returned to Seoul before the group was formed.

A co-defendant, Rev. Mun Ik

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Grenada Severs Ties With S. Korea

Grenada People's Revolutionary Government severed diplomatic relations with south Korea.

Grenada's severance of diplomatic relations with the south Korean authorities is a clear manifestation of the resolute anti-imperialists and independent stand of the government and people of Grenada who value national dignity and sovereignty.

Grenada is pursuing an independent foreign policy, opposing all forms of domination and subordination, and its external authority and prestige are rising day by day as a dignified non-aligned country.

The fraternal relations of friendship and cooperation between the governments and peoples of the DPRK and Grenada will further expand and develop on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, independence and non-aligned movement.

Chon Backed By Washington, Tokyo

South Korean strongman Chon Du Hwan, with active backing of Washington and Tokyo, makes all-out efforts to create another "yusin" dictatorship.

An August 8 AP dispatch reported that Gen. Wickham made public the willingness of his government to support Gen. Chon when and if he was installed as chief executive and consolidated his power. Gen. Wickham reportedly listed the three conditions for possible U.S. support for Chon; (1) legal assumption of power; (2) assurance of wide public support; (3) guarantee of national security. The statement of Wickham was clearly intended to call upon the south Korean people to support Gen. Chon as he was aware of the still widespread criticism of Chon's behavior.

Gen. Wickham disclosed that the U.S. refused in January demand of south Korean military officers to get rid of Chon Du Hwan with help of the U.S. Meanwhile, he said that the south Korean side was told in order to eschew move to withdraw Chon Du Hwan because it might invite war in Korean Peninsula.

He also said that Chon Du Hwan, possible another Pak Jung Hi, might remain in presidential office for life. This means that the U.S. shores up Chon Du Hwan to take the presidential chair.

Expressing "regrets" and "concern" on the development in south Korea, the U.S. didn't take concrete steps to prevent Chon Du Hwan from cracking down on the south Korean people advancing towards democracy and freedom.

The U.S. State Department spokesman denied on August 9 that the statement of Gen. Wickham supporting Gen. Chon Du Hwan's assumption of the presidency, reflected the view of the U.S. Government as it was his personal view. It is a mere excuse to justify the U.S.'s policy toward south Korea.

Gen. Wickham, supporting Chon Du Hwan for "security" in Korea, permitted the use of frontline troops under his command for raids on the city of Kwangju when its people rose in an uprising. Representatives of the Kwangju people asked the U.S. forces to mediate between them and the martial law command authorities but fell on deaf ears. Radio Kwangju and U.S. army radio broadcast the request once but did not repeat it on the orders of the U.S. army authorities. With the approval and support of Gen Wickham, Gen. Chon installed himself as chairman of the standing committee for national security measures and named many brass hats as members of the standing committee.

The Tokyo authorities, in conspiracy with Washington, also takes an active part in bolstering up the suppressive policy of the Chon Du Hwan military group.

The Japanese authorities dispatched a special envoy to Seoul at the time when a number of countries all over the world and particularly capitalist countries censured the Chon Du Hwan military group engaged in the May 17 coup d'etat where over 2,000 people were indiscriminately slain in Kwangju. After their special envoy's return, they made public support for the Chon Du Hwan junta, following the policy of the Washington government.

A 127-man Japanese buying mission was dispatched in the beginning of July to Seoul in order to shore up the Chon Du Hwan junta which were suffering from economic crisis--It was the largest Japanese buying mission to Seoul since the "south Korea-Japan treaty" was concluded in 1965.

The Japanese leaders led by Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko expressed support for the Chon Du Hwan junta when they met "prime minister" Pak Chung Hun, "foreign minister" Pak Tong Jin and Chon Il Gwon, chief of south Korea-Japan parliamentary union, who visit Japan to attend the funeral of Japanese ex-prime minister Ohira Masayoshi.

General KIM IL SUNG Asked by Communist International to Help Soviet Union

On August 10, 1940, the then General Kim Il Sung decided to accept the advice of the Communist International and abandoned large-unit operations in favor of small-unit ones in order to deprive the Japanese imperialists of an excuse to launch a pincers attack on the Soviet Union in concert with Nazi Germany.

This was for the first time disclosed in his speech "On Preparing the Great Event of National Liberation" whose text was made available in English in 1976 by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Pyongyang. The speech was delivered as a report to the Meeting of Military and Political Cadres of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army (KPRA) at Hsiaohaerhpaling, Tunhua County, Northeast China.

To use the words of the General, "If the Soviet Union receives a pincers attack from the fascist powers, not only its security and socialist construction but also the development of world revolution as a whole and world peace will be threatened seriously."

He went on:

"In this connection, the Communist International has recently sent a liaison officer to us and advised that the anti-Japanese guerrilla units operating in the area of Manchuria had better stop large-unit operations for the time being in order to ease the tense situation along the Soviet-Manchurian border and not to give the Japanese imperialist aggressors an excuse for launching an aggressive war against the Soviet Union.

"We cannot but take account of the advice of the Communist International because the Japanese imperialists regard the struggle of the anti-Japanese guerilla units as 'hostile act' of the Soviet Union against them and try to use it as a pretext for provoking an aggressive war against the Soviet Union. It is a lofty internationalist duty of the Communists to check and foil the attempt of the fascist powers to invade" the Soviet Union and defend this socialist state."

The General cited another reason for the switch to small-unit operations to preserve and build up the revolutionary forces for with an eye to the eventual defeat of Japan.

Also presented was the policy of preserving and constructing the revolutionary forces and training all the members of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army into an army of competent military and political leaders.

This policy of maintaining and training the revolutionary forces was not meant only for the immediate revolutionary task of overthrowing the Japanese and for the liberation of Korea. It was also aimed at making preparations to achieve the final objective of the anti-Japanese armed struggle in a final decisive battle when a favorable situation was created. Moreover, this was, indeed a far-sighted plan to build a new society in a liberated fatherland with these trained forces as the foundation.

After the Hsiaohaerhpaling Meeting the Korean People's Revolutionary Army units were reorganized into many small units and groups. They were sent to different areas throughout Korea.

Members of the small political groups were posted in various parts of Korea disguised as workers, peasants, office employees, jobless persons, day labourers, to have close ties with the masses, and formed underground revolutionary organizations.

The small units and groups of the KPRA carried out raids and reconnoitring duties actively, in addition to their political work.

By the time of the liberation, they had crossed the Tuman River through a heavily guarded frontier and advanced to far-away Wonsan, Pyongyang, Seoul, Inchon and Pusan.

The courageous activities of the members of the small units and groups of the KPRA convinced the majority of the people that the day of liberation was at hand. The members fought bravely, true to their national conscience and revolutionary principle, despite the enemy's fascist repression.

The brilliant activities of the small units of the KPRA made a great contribution to the final victorious battle against the Japanese.

Operations of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army units changed from large-unit operations to small-unit ones according to the strategic policy of the then General Kim Il Sung. The new strategic policy was defined at the Hsiaoharhpaling Meeting, held on August 10 and 11, 1940 in Tunghua county of northeast China with the attendance of most of its military and political leaders. Photo: Picture of the Hsiaohaerhpaling Meeting at which the General delivered a report "To Positively Meet the Great Revolutionary Event of the Coming National Liberation".

Youth Chemical Complex in Photos

Unlike south Korean petro-chemical complexes, the Youth Chemical Complex (South Pyongan Province), one of leading chemical industrial complexes of the DPRK, is neither a joint venture with foreign concerns nor a foreign-owned company. No foreign engineer is hired. It uses domestically produced coal, not imported oil.

Its features are several most advanced plants, including a uric acid fertilizer plant, a high-pressure polyethylene plant and an acrylic fiber plant.

It annually turns out 225,000 tons of polyethylene, 10,000 tons of orlon, 10,000 tons of acrylic fiber and a great amount of other chemical products.

Effective anti-pollution devices are attached. Its waste water is processed to under 0.5 PPM for release into the Chongchon River.

For its more than 5,000 workers, mainly 23-25 years old, it has a theater, a hospital, a park and houses.

The DPRK does not rely on oil imports as a major fuel and a source of raw materials. Locally available coal is a key material in the national economy. It has many coal mines including Anju (S. Pyongan Prov.) and Kogowon (N. Hamgyong Prov.) coal mines. Its estimated coal reserves are 8 billion tons.

Even when nearly 200 countries of the world suffer from an oil crisis, the DPRK is not affected.



PHOTO:
(Top right) Part of the high-pressure polyethylene plant
(Below right) Inside of the automated spinning plant
(Below left) View of the central control room

10th Contact Postponed to Sep. 28

Pyongyang informed that there was no other choice but to put off, for the time being, contact between the working-level delegates to arrange a north-south premiers' meeting till the situation was restored to normal in south Korea.

This was announced by Rim Chun Gil, deputy chief delegates of the DPRK, when he met the working-level delegates of the south side at 10 a.m., August 20, at the Panmungak Hall in the DPRK's portion of Panmunjom.

He proposed that the working-level delegates of the north and the south have the 10th contact on September 30 in the same place.

After all, an agreement was reached between the two sides that they should meet for the 10th contact in the south side part of Panmunjom on September 26.

Main points of Rim Chun Gil's statement follow:

- The absense of a premier on the south side to contact the DPRK on an equal footing makes it useless for both sides to talk about a premiers' contact at present.
- The DPRK can not understand what is happening within south Korea at all nor can it see where the south side is going to lead this contact.
- Pyongyang considers it meaningless to continue the contact between the working-level delegates for a premiers' contact in the present situation.

Reasons are:

1) With the resignation of the premier of the south side whom Pyongyang proposed to meet in a letter, there is actually no counterpart of the DPRK on the south side for a premiers' contact.

2) In south Korea changes are taking place almost every day within the authorities.

3) Impermissible acts running counter to a proposed contact are now being committed by the south side.

-Fascist suppression of politicians and democrats calling for democracy and peaceful reunification is being intensified as never before.

-Anti-communist hysteria against and increased confrontation with Pyongyang, a party to a proposed dialogue, are being stepped up to an unprecedented pitch by a handful of military leaders who have seized all the three powers of south Korea.

American Quaker Report on Significant Shift In Popular Attitude to Northerners and Americans

You are culprit.

A report on south Korea after Kwangju prepared by the Quaker International Affairs Program of the American Friends Service Committee notes a significant shift in the popular perception of the northern people and the Americans.

The report is entitled, "Two Months after Kwangju: What Next for South Korea?"

The report also detects growing signs of the once non-violent movement becoming violent.

Follow excerpts:

Kwangju

We arrived in Kwangju after a long ride from Pusan, greeted by soldiers checking our bus, looking carefully at faces, especially of young people. Except for the soldiers, however, Kwangju at first glance appeared to be a completely normal city. The south Korea government's depiction of resistance there as a "riot" was obviously false.

There were no blocks of charred buildings, no acres of devastation. In fact, Kwangju is a very pleasing city, slower-paced than Seoul, with more open space and surrounded by beautiful mountains. But a closer look revealed signs of the nightmare of violence faced by the people there. A blackened TV station towered over surrounding buildings, burnt because it tried to cover up military atrocities, falsifying the number of people killed by the soldiers. Charred cars were piled on a vacant lot at the edge of the city. There was a noticeably large number of young people with broken arms or almost ostentatious white hand bandages, worn like badges of honor. Armed soldiers patrolled the streets in pairs. Saddest of all, we saw two young children playing, stabbing at each other with bayonet-like rolled umbrellas.

People in Kwangju are convinced that 1,000 to 2,000 people were killed by the military during the resistance. Thousands have been detained, and recent arrests include women and men who took food out to the demonstrators, as well as 17 professors of Chonnam University. Soldiers surrounded the Catholic Cathedral when the Church tried to hold a memorial service for the dead, and 8 priests were taken away.

We visited a small village near Kwangju and learned how the military terror had affected the whole region. Parents were frantic with concern about their sons and daughters who worked or studied in Kwangju. Military roadblocks made travel dangerous and at one nearby checkpoint, 3 local buses were found, riddled with bullets. Farmers near Kwangju discovered routes to get food into the city, and we were told that those hiding from the military "would of course be given shelter in many village." The myth of a conservative countryside, loyal to the government, is cracking fast. It was a period of horror for the people in and around Kwangju. The fact that the military responded to a small, peaceful demonstration with the intent to intimidate through brutality is still considered almost beyond comprehension. One man said to us, "We have to believe that God will punish the evil-doers."

At the same time, the period during which they held the city against the military is one of great pride for Kwangju people. We were told numerous stories of the sense of community and cooperation during that time. Residents carried water to the demonstrators, people organized clean-up programs, rural transportation was contrived to get people to the regular market days, and when blood was needed, long lines of donors waited for hours (particularly significant in Korea where giving blood runs very counter to cultural patterns.) We heard that at one point the rumor went through the city that toothpaste smeared on the face was an effective antidote to tear gas; keepers of small stores ran out into the streets giving away all their tubes trying to help.

People in Kwangju also felt a tremendous sense of openness during that time, an opportunity to express things only heard in whispers before. An American reported being approached repeatedly by Koreans who spoke freely with him and others, criticizing the military, the political situation and the economy, comments he had never heard made in public previously. He said, "Since the curtain of silence fell on the city, with the return of the military on May 27th, all that anger has once again been forced inside." His experience, echoed by others, seemed to lay at rest for once and for all, the claim made by the US Embassy that it is only a small, Western-oriented group whichh is dissatisfied with the Yushin political and economic system in south Korea. We asked Kwangju people whether they thought Kim Dae Jung, who comes from that province, is a communist as the government has charged. The answer, "Of course not." A question about whether he was responsible for the Kwangju massacre brought incredulous looks and "No, no, no."

Seoul

In Seoul we were greeted with the comment, "Park is starting to look good." Soldiers, although apparently less visible than a month ago and now often garbed in the blue-gray National Police uniforms, are still at major intersections, at underpasses and even on side streets. We saw the encampment of several thousand troops at Yonsei University and the incredibly belligerant looking black beret paratroopers stationed at Sogang University.

Papers are more heavily censored than ever before and approximately 700 reporters have been arrested during this period. Sharing information is very difficult. We were warned against trying to zerox documents because even the operators of the smallest copy shops are checked by the military and ordered to report any suspicious looking materials.

Many people are still in hiding.

(Continued on page 4)

Army paratroopers led by Gen. Chon Du Hwan dragging a slain body of the arrested student during the Kwangju massacre on May 27.

Economic Chiefs of 4 News Papers:

Panel Discussion on S. Korean Economy

(Continued from the previous issue)

Moderator: Well, speaking about the problem of adjusting capital investments in the electric power, I must say that the amount of capital investments and the number of employees in the industry have already become enormously large. After all, the government which could not meet even demand for funds from other industries, permitted the four big zaibatsu to invest in the power industry. And now it says that it is necessary to adjust investments. Anyway, the government will be compelled to do so because our country's economy has been severely damaged.

However, as the government can not find a man of action, equal to the task, it seems that the present government intends to pass the task to a new "administration". But here, too, are some problems.

For example, our country is expanding the domestic production of automobiles, and is going to compete with advanced countries, in spite of the present status of the industry. Japan towers above all competitors and the U.S. is going into mass production of new, small size automobiles. It seems that our country has made a mistake in its measures to attain an international level of automobile production.

Li: A certain businessman pointed out that the heavy chemical industries of our country could be compared to an inverted pyramid. The foundations of our heavy industry have not yet been established. Our competition in the international market is unthinkable, when medium and small industries are still in their infancy and when techniques are still being inducted from other countries. In addition, they have a very weak foundation of production.

Pae: I guess that the establishment of the heavy chemical industry originated in a power struggle between big enterprises: While it is common knowledge that the economic efficiency of an industry lowers if too many enterprises compete in it, the government allows four companies to import electronic switchboards, three major firms to operate in the auto industry, four companies in the color T.V. industry. Meanwhile, this situation is seen in the computer and semiconductor sectors. The problem is that the government has no administrative capacity to conduct preliminary investigations. The government is not able to persuade enterprises into adjusting capital investments or establish policy, but is involved in power struggles among enterprises in the course of policy-making. As a result, we have the present situation. Due to long-term corrupt relations between the economic bureaucrats and enterprises, the government can't withstand pressures from big business. The problem of the selection of an electronic exchange system is the case in point. The four big zaibatsu companies competed sharply with each other for the acquisition of a government permission, and the government finally was compelled to settle the problem by adopting the system of joint operation of the electronic exchange service. Thus, the Korea Telecommunication Corporation was established. However, the establishment of the company means that a final conclusion has been postponed. The government sold the KTC to a specific zaibatsu concern which newly selected a new electronic exchange system. In this situation, the problem of redundant capital investment is feared.

Thus, so long as the government can not restore its administrative capability of adjusting investments, enterprises will be unable to adjust investments in the heavy chemical industry. It is interesting that Hyundail Company and Hyundai Heavy Industry, which are supposed to be affiliates, have different ideas, and that the government is not in a position to adjust relations between the two companies.

Moderator: Actually, in the past, economic policy was aimed at promoting quantative growth because of political reasons. In heavy and chemical industries alone, they have been repeating trials and errors without any definite future prospects, while expanding rapidly when business is forging ahead. We have the same problem in the energy policy. Recently, as the prices of crude oil have jumped several times, the government has to change the industrial structure from oil-consuming industries to knowledge-intensive and technology-oriented industries. But the government has not yet worked out an oil demand-supply plan for this year.

However, our country faced a critical condition several times in the supply-demand situation of oil. When the Iranian situation was not so bad as it is now, the supply of 40,000 barrels per day was suspended temporarily but was resumed soon. However, the Minister of Energy and Resources visited oil-producing countries and conducted not oil foreign policy but oil-begging foreign policy.

For factories, oil is like rice. So, enterprises can't work out long-term plans in view of an unstable supply of their principal "food." Let's discuss the energy problem.

No Timely Information on Oil

The government, for a long time, has totally depended on major oil corporations its energy policy, but they were already uncapable of supplying oil when our country declared it bad to depend less on oil. It was too late.

When our country totally depended on major oil companies for oil supply, we did not have our own information on oil. The biggest problem is that the government did not have its own sources of information on oil even after the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Ministry of Energy and Resources were made responsible for oil policy.

When the government examines oil policy, it regarded in the past and regards even Japanese news agencies from oil-producing countries as valuable materials. Under these circumstances, our country's energy policy is not such as would guarantee a stable supply of oil. As the government has no positive capability to get information on oil, there is no other way.

When the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was responsible for oil policy, the government felt little need of obtaining information of oil, because the major oil corporations dominated our country's oil market. After our country declared its independence from the oil corporations, the minister visited oil-producing countries for cheap oil supply and the government instructed private firms to buy oil, but they are now hanging around the high-cost spot oil market, no knowing where they should go. Even on the spot market, the government does not have accurate information. It sends a mission there after the market price was already raised. As far as I see, there is no new counter-measure to take, and the situation will drag on this way.

(To be continued)

Resistance Forces Enjoy Popular Support

(Continued from page 3)

fearing arrest. Perhaps up to 500 persons have had to keep completely out of sight since May 17th. Initially, there were approximately 10,000 in hiding but by now people say that at any given time there are probably a total of several thousand who must avoid going home or showing up for work for at least several weeks, because a friend or neighbor has been arrested. Those taken are forced to account for their time during the previous month, hour by hour – who they met and what they discussed. Younger brothers and wives of those in hiding have been held by the military to try to force family members to give up. One family providing shelter to someone in hiding was severely beaten by soldiers. A foreign priest, who accompanied a young student to the police station who had decided to give himself up, was later abducted in a car and questioned in a back alley room for several hours. There is a great need for funds to support those in hiding and their families – to pay for rooms, food and medical care.

Conditions of those to be terrible, but it is very difficult to get specific information since the military will not reveal where many are held. The refusal of family contact, in some cases for 2 months now, is cruel. Reports in south Korean prisons the provision of food, bedding and clothing by the family is almost a necessity. Families of those imprisoned are specifically forbidden to have contact with any persons who are released from prison and might have information. Each of the wives of the eight men charged along with Kim Dae Jung is accompanied everywhere by a policeman Lee Heee Ho (Kim Dae Jung's wife) is not allowed to leave her house, have visitors, nor has she been given information about whether her husband is even still alive. Paik Kye Won, Director of the Institute on Unification, is under guard in a hospital, totally paralyzed from beatings, unable to move his arms and thought unlikely to walk again.

Just during the few days we were in Seoul there were 28 key arrests made: 6 Catholic priests and a nun, 11 university professors, 3 Protestant ministers, 4 reporters and 3 lawyers. The main charge against Sister Chung Marianna and the priests seems to be circulating first hand accounts about Kwangju. Cardinal Kim announced publicly that what the Catholics reported was the truth, and there is some hope that the Catholic Church will stand firm against what appears to be a major new effort to discredit it.

A few medical and specialized colleges have been reopened by the military, but each campus is required to report hourly to Seoul on any student missing from class. Other campuses have been told that their reopening in the fall depends on providing lists of all students involved in demonstrations and those previously arrested. While we were there the Yonsei faculty and others were debating how to respond.

There is deep concern about the coming trial of Kim Dae Jung and 8 others, which has been publicly announced with a fanfare of charts, photos (including 1 of the ballpoint pens Kim distributed with his name on them) and plot allegations reminiscent of the internationally discredited PRP case of 1974 in which 8 persons were hanged. The human rights movement is adamant that the only crime of Kim and the others was to work for democracy and is afraid these are the people the military most wants dead. They say, "Kim Dae Jung is not a communist and he is not responsible for Kwangju." Recently a newspaper revealed that the 5 million won supposedly given by Kim Dae Jung to Chosun University students actually came from the University's student activity fund. One person stressed to us, "The student body presidents were elected because their thinking was that of their classmates, not because of bribes." There is fear that Kim Dae Jung and the others may be brought to trial drugged as some defendents have been in the past. People pleaded with us to encourage an international campaign for their release.

This strong support for Kim Dae Jung, despite the charges that he is a communist, is significant. In the past the government has been repeatedly successful in discrediting its opponents through allegations of communist connections. Even friends and close associates of those arrested have often been too frightened to come to their defense. It was good to hear on this trip that in addition to the solid support of the human rights movement, and estimated half of the general population was thought not to have been taken in by the government's propaganda.

On May 19, Kwangju demonstrators burn cars, angered by the atrocities of the black beret paratroopers against citizens.

Kwangju protestors drive commandeered vehicles with a banner on their front reading "Dismember Chon Du Hwan!"

Miraculously, resistance continues even in this difficult situation. People are still finding ways to print leaflets and slip them under doors in the evening hours. A rubber stamp calling for the death of Chun Doo Hwan is being used to decorate the back of bus seats. On June 12th, there was a small demonstration at the Kuro Industrial Site in Seoul, supporting workers' rights, and there have been small student demonstrations in Kwangju and at the Kyunbuk Medical College in Taegu during the past few weeks. Sermons about Kwangju are still being preached in some churches. Students and others are conferring to plan what to do next.

No one knows when something big might happen. There is speculation that major public protest might come at any one of these points: If Kim Dae Jung and the others are found guilty, especially if they are killed; if the government attempts physical brutality on a large scale again like during the initial days in Kwangju; at the end of October if the promised new constitution is like Park's Yushin document or keeps power for the military; and if and when the colleges open again this fall. Many feel, however, that the threat of student protest is so great that if the government opens the campuses at all it will only be for the few days necessary to collect the students' tuition and then it will close them again. This, of course, would only add to the anti-government anger of the many not-so-rich parents who are spending everything for their children's education.

Chun Doo Hwan

A number of people stressed that it is very important to understand the nature of Chun Doo Hwan and the several generals thought to make up his inner circle. "These are not just power-grabbers. They are fanatically sure that they are superpatriots called upon to eradicate all evil." "They are confident of their ends, and means do not matter – so you have Kwangju where soldiers were drugged and deprived of food to increase their brutality."

We talked with one person whose cousin is a member of the paratroopers who initiated the violence in Kwangju. He explained that the paratroopers recruit people with psychological problems and train them to have absolute loyalty to their leaders. Our friend's cousin once said, "Sometimes I just want to go out on the street and shoot everyone I see. If you think I'm crazy you should see the others." These are considered Chun's "elite troops."

Chun and those close to him – many of whom now hold positions on the Military Standing Committee running the country – are believed to have been recruited personally by Park Chung Hee into a secret organization. They called Park their father and a major part of their responsibility was to detect any anti-Park sentiments in the military. Park is said to have given them access to special funds and told them not to become corrupt from other sources. Chun's current position as head of the Defense Security Command continues to provide him with a network of informers which make any moves against him in the military very difficult.

Chun's current purges of thousands of bureaucrats were seen as killing several birds with one stone: Personal experience with the corruption of the government is commonplace in south Korea, so removing those known to be involved in bribery is in general a popular move with the people. However, there is considerable cynicism about how long any purification will last in a repressive situation in which officials cannot be criticized from below or outside the government. It is also realized that many are being replaced because during the past year they've expressed support for democratization or have spoken against the military. We heard of one case where a government official lost a relative in Kwangju but won't admit it even to friends because if the government knew, it'd be assumed he was anti-military and he'd be purged. In addition, it is feared that those newly advanced by Chun, in many cases over the heads of more experienced people, will be grateful and thus loyal to the military.

This is not to say that Chun's position is at all secure. In fact, most people believe him to have become more isolated than ever since May 17th. There is a joke going around that Park had 4 official cars so that no one could tell which one he'd riding in and attack it – and that Chun has 10! There are rumors of two assassination attempts against Chun, one the week before we arrived. The economy is suffering horribly, both from basic structural problems and from the paralysis of all decision-making caused by the purges. Someone at the US Embassy remarked, "Half my contacts have disappeared. Who am I supposed to talk to?" And even the civilian based Korean elite sounds fed up with Chun. A prominent lawyer said, "I don't have any friends in the military. They didn't attend my schools. I need to get my network back. I can't make any money as it is."

What Next?

The situation is obviously very frightening. As one person said to us, "My god, what can students do against paratroopers?" At the same time, the past two months have created deep anger at many levels in the country (which incidentally we felt the US Embassy personnel didn't understand at all.) People feel tricked. They say, "From October to May the government acted as if we were free to speak, but all the time was taking notes and pictures. Now they've arrested or purged anyone who came forward." There have been two public suicides by activists who obviously hoped that their statements would trigger a major protest. One contact described the changes in people after Kwangju this way, "Hard-core activists have become so angry they are willing to kill themselves. Those previously on the fringe are now ready to be involved. The former mutterers, for example, cab drivers and shopkeepers, are speaking out now. They are so angry they don't care."

The massive demonstrations in

(Continued on page 5)

How Thin Support for Chon Du Hwan Is

(Continued from page 4)

mid-May of 50,000 and 100,000 persons were very orderly and essentially nonviolent, even in the face of serious police provocation. The movement in south Korea has been generally very non-violent up to this point. It still is, but people are talking increasingly about the use of force – both about prolonged armed struggle and about terrorist attacks (the latter in particular has some meaning to those who expect arrest and certain torture to be only a matter of time and don't want to endure that for nothing.) This seems to us to be a clear case in which despair over Chun's institutionalized violence, particularly buttressed by a deep sense of betrayal by the US, is driving a nonviolent movement increasingly toward violence.

It is certain that the May 17th coup and the Kwangju experience have radicalized many people, creating the possibility of a stronger movement, of whatever kind emerges. Things are being said now by many people which would have been uttered only rarely in the most secretive conditions before. In the past, the Christians in the opposition in particular have been moderate, with their views very much affected by anti-communism and faith in the US government. There are still considerable differences among those in the opposition movement, so the comments we heard do not reflect an official position, but coming from a range of Christians, students, reporters and workers, we believe there are significant shifts on two issues: attitudes toward north Korea and attitudes toward the US.

Attitudes toward North Korea

Some activists now seem to believe that it was a mistake to accept the government's position that the greatest conceivable threat to the society comes from north Korea. People are saying that conditions in the south are so terrible that the north can't be worse. Their comments don't show enthusiasm for the north, but do stress that the "threat of communism" can no longer be used to justify an abusive government in the south and continued lack of progress on the unification issue.

There is an adage going the rounds that "Chun is the lion protecting us against the northern tiger in order to eat us himself." A group of Seoul students, described to us as formerly very hesitant, said after Kwangju, "The student resistance has just begun. It will have two major focuses: anti-Americanism and unification of the country at any cost. It doesn't matter whose terms. There's no difference anymore." In Kwangju, people said about Chun's troops, "This is just like the Korean War." Christians have asked rather openly, "Who is the enemy, the north or the government?" A group of workers told an American, "If the north invades, they won't hurt us. They'd be after the people at the top."

Attitudes toward the US

In the past the human rights movement in south Korea has been unclear on the question of what kind of action it wanted from the US government. Those who wanted strong sanctions by the US against Park Chung Hee – for example, withdrawal of the support of military aid and troops – were in the minority and were not among the internationally best known Christian leaders. Most appeals boiled down to requesting symbolic actions, quiet diplomacy or lectures from the US. Many people seemed to believe that despite the long years of US support for Park Chung Hee, that in the end the US would help Koreans establish democracy. An American reported that in Kwangju he was repeatedly begged to "Please get the American troops to come to Kwangju and save us." It was ironic that the official appeal of the Kwangju Citizens Committee for US mediation was censored off the air of Armed Forces Radio in Korea, on orders of a US General.

American support of Chun during the Kwangju incident and during the past two months seems to have created major changes in activists' attitudes toward the US. In Kwangju an American told us he saw cans of tear gas with "Made in the USA" on them, and that Koreans he knew assumed that all the weapons used against them came from America. Over and over we heard of Koreans' horror that US General Wickham released Korean troops under his command to reimpose Chun's power in Kwangju. It was pointed out to us that in 1960, when people rebelled against Syngman Rhee, the US refused to release soldiers to put down the civil disturbances. The US is perceived as much more concerned about maintaining its friendship with Chun and the other generals than with the Korean people. Americans told us of being asked by a number of Korean Christians, "Why don't you get your troops out?" Troop withdrawal is apparently considered the most effective US sanction by a good many people. In the past one of the reasons given against US troop withdrawals was that the US military would at least protect the south Korean population and the democratic movement from the south Korean military. Now after Kwangju, human rights activists no longer have faith in this argument.

Others, while still believing the troops are necessary to protect the south from the north, nevertheless urged that the US should take very strong economic sanctions. There seemed almost unanimous agreement among activists that the US should cut off economic aid and financial loans.

We were told of much anger about the visit to Seoul by the US Export-Import Bank President promising funds to Chun just two weeks after his military crackdown on May 17th. Nor had the visit of 160 US businessmen in early June gone unnoticed. "It's your economic interests, not ours, they're concerned about," an American was told by Koreans. Referring to US loans granted for telephone switching equipment and nuclear power plants one comment was, "Maybe that'll help us someday and maybe it won't hurt workers and farmers."

We were in Seoul at the time Stephen Solarz visited before going on to Pyongyang. Several people commented that they thought the US should talk directly with the north – "maybe that would put some pressure on." Even a Korean policeman was reported to have remarked about Solarz's trip, "That's probably a good idea."

The US's Position

We met with two persons at the American Embassy, to express our concern about US policy and also to learn how they saw the situation. The interviews were appalling.

We talked with Spence Richardson, First Secretary in the Political Section, about the range of policy options the US has. He said, "Yes, we have a lot of things we could do. We could withdraw the troops. We could effect the economy. We have a lot of power here. The question is, do we want to use it. The answer is no."

He said the US's "security interest is paramount. We'll never withdraw the troops." Richardson also explained, "We have tremendous business interests here. To say the least, they wouldn't be happy losing money here if the economy failed." He said, "US business here wants to make money. They're capitalists. Americans see stability as the key."

We also talked with Jack Klemstein, First Secretary in the Economic Section, who admitted the US was not using the economic sanctions that it could. "The US either abstained or voted no on an Inchon Port loan by the Asian Development Bank (he didn't know which). That's all the US has done." He said the Export-Import Bank loans won't be stopped "because the US needs the exports." He said, "We won't do anything unless something really blatant happens." Thinking about Kwangju, we asked a bit incredulously what it would take to be blatant. He did say that "The hanging of Kim Dae Jung would be blatant. Then we'll have to do something. US and Korean public opinion would demand it."

It is of course instructive to compare the US response in Korea to that in Bolivia where the Carter administration reacted forcefully to the July military coup by ending all military assistance and economic aid, and by withdrawing most of its military and diplomatic personnel.

Someone who knows a lot of the Embassy staff in south Korea observed to us that they are largely Cold Warriors, many of them posted outside the US since the 1950's. "They missed the changes in the States in the 1960's and 70's. This is especially critical in Korea where the situation of a divided peninsula tends to evoke simplistic analyses." Many people criticized American Embassy personnel to us as hopelessly naive as well, thinking that General Chun would respond to diplomatic subtleties, assuming a cancelled dinner would convey a major rebuke. The situation in the Embassy may not be helped by this summer's major transfer of personnel. No one was mourning the loss of John Lamazza (whom dissidents believed spied on them for the CIA) but the turnover of several other top posts is expected to create a situation where newcomers will accept Chun's government as the established order and, having missed the events of recent months, will not realize how thin his support is.

We found little reason to hope that any initiative for changed US policy is going to come from the Embassy in Seoul. The Quaker leader Ham Sok Hon probably put it to us best, "We need the American people to be stronger. Chun will only listen to military power. The situation is going to depend on US policy about its army." Certainly all the actions which can be initiated by Koreans have "dreadful, bloody risks involved. An altered American policy – demanded by activists in the US, ending military and economic support of Chun – seems to us to offer the only nonviolent possibility for change.

Slain bodies of the arrested students and citizens laid down on the main street of Kwangju during the Chon Du Hwan-led paratroopers' atrocities committed on May 27.

Students and citizens of Kwangju City, in cooperation with each other, carried an injured on a stretcher to a city hospital.

This Is What Chon Du Hwan Did

Roped coffins of victims in front of the provincial government building in Kwangju. (May 27)

Martial law troops guard a group of protestors rounded up in a May 27 predawn raid on Kwangju citizens.

Combat-ready martial law paratroopers commit brutalities against Kwangju citizens. (May 19)

The Affair Is Not Over; People Will Remember It

The most ominous fact about south Korea is that the life-and-death battle for democracy is far from over, with key problems left unsolved. For the moment, the Chon Du Hwan junta seems to be consolidating its power, yet the people will remember what the martial-law troops did in Kwangju and in other parts of the country in a deadly operation against the democratic forces.

Firstly, these photos taken by American and Western cameramen for news organizations depict clearly the nature of the new "Yusin President" Chon Du Hwan as responsible of the Kwangju massacre and the death of democratic aspirations. The people will never forget what Chon did. It is worthy of note that in Seoul alone live one million people hailing from north and south Cholla provinces.

These photos tell who is the enemy of the Korean people and who is the guardian of Korean democracy. A widespread realization now is that their government has proved to be an enemy of the Korean people and the American forces its ally. This has created a significant and probably most potential change in the popular attitude toward the northern people and the Americans.

According to a report on south Korea by the American Friends Service Committee, the students are focussing their attention on two things as goals of the democratic dissident movement: the anti-American sentiments and the achievement of reunification.

Secondly, the economic situation of south Korea is passing the endurance point. There is no immediate prospect of economic recovery. The recession is hard-hitting, adversely affecting the masses of people. With large emergency dosages of money from Washington and Tokyo, the Chon junta is trying to tide over the crisis. No good remedy is available.

Thirdly, the international credibility of the Chon regime is beyond repair. The Kim Dae Jung trial by the court-martial on framed charges has touched off international outcries, prompting Scandinavian countries, France, West Germany to protest the Seoul junta. A couple of Third World countries severed diplomatic relations with Seoul.

All these things show that as "a disciple outshines his master," Gen. Chon is dwarfing his predecessors Syngman Rhee and Pak Jung Hi in terms of authoritarian repression. Gen. Chon has sown seeds of future trouble, placing south Korea on a roller coaster toward final breakup like that which gripped Nicaragua and Iran.

(Continued page 7)

A kid clad in mourning costume holds the portrait of his dad killed by martial law troops in Kwangju. (Time, June 9)

to Become New 'Yusin President'

(Continued from page 6)

These photos and the following list of what Chon has done since his installation as new military ruler on December 12 last provide a clear indication of what will become of south Korea under Chon.

Gen. Chon has established his notoriety when he
–killed the democratic hopes
–established himself as a new tyrant worse than his predecessor
–confronted Kim Dae Jung and other democratic dissident leaders with possible death
–converted south Korea into a classic garrison state, police state
–placed the resumed north-south negotiations in serious jeopardy
–discredited the international credibility of the Korean nation
–determined to keep south Korea subject to economic, political and military domination both by the United States and Japan
–slaughtered more than 3,000 people of Kwangju
–wounded more than 15,000 people of Kwangju
–bayoneted a three-year child to death
–shot to death infants and elders
–stripped girl students naked publicly, raped them and killed
–cut off breasts of girl students
–disemboweled pregnant women and took out fetuses
–machinegunned busloads of citizens and students in Kwangju
–killed youths and citizens with flame throwers
–burned dead bodies to reduce the number of toll and make impossible their identification
–rounded up tens of thousands of people on charges of demanding democracy and reunification

Photos, clockwise from top:

- **A youth burned to death with a flame thrower when martial law troops attacked on Kwangju protestors at predawn, May 27. (Imperial Press)**
- **The face of a killed youth whose face was battered to prevent his identification**
- **A martial law paratrooper badly clubs an unresisting Kwangju youth, May 20.**
- **Martial law troops detain Kwangju protestors.**

Anti-Americanism Increasing in S. Korea

The latest developments in south Korea demonstrate the close association between the south Korean yusin remnant forces and the Americans. The growing public awareness of the role of the United States in the death of democracy result in anti-American backlashes.

When Pak Jung Hi appeared on the political stage, there were still some people who had some illusion about him, as he raised such slogans as "Stamping out injustice and corruption" and "New politics."

Although Pak Jung Hi used the words "May 16 military revolution" and this was acceptable to a certain extent, Chon Du Hwan cannot appeal to such a term. Chon Du Hwan is nothing but a second Pak Jung Hi, an oppressor, "yusin" diehard and a strangulator of democracy to the south Korean people.

In spite of this fact, the Americans did nothing except for expressing "concern" and "regrets" when full martial law was expanded nationwide.

The Americans came to the aid of Chon Du Hwan. Citing the alleged threat from the north, the Americans allowed him to use south Korean troops under their command for operations against Kwangju and Seoul. Flattops, Midway and Coral Sea, and other naval ships, were ordered into Korean waters, as E3A's were removed to Okinawa. They gave unhesitating support to Chon Du Hwan and his company, trained in the United States and Vietnam veterans, who spoke good English and worshipped the things American.

American support of Chon during the Kwangju incident and during the past two months seems to have created major changes in activists' attitudes toward the U.S. In Kwangju an American told he saw cans of tear gas with "Made in the USA" on them, and that Koreans he knew assumed that all the weapons used against them came from America. In 1960, when people uprised against Sygnman Rhee, the U.S. refused to release soldiers to put down the civil disturbances. U.S. Gen. Wickham, however, released south Korean troops under his command to reimpose Chon's power in Kwangju.

The U.S. is perceived as much more concerned about maintaining its friendship with Chon and the other generals than with the Korean people. South Korean Christians asked Americans, "Why don't you get your troops out?" Troop withdrawal is apparently considered the most effective U.S. sanction by a good many people. In the past one of the reasons given against U.S. troop withdrawals was that the U.S. military would at least protect the south Korean population and the democratic movement from the south Korean military. Now after Kwangju, human rights activists no longer have faith in this argument.

Immediately after Chon's extention of martial law, the U.S. Export-Emport Bank announced it was loaning $200 million to south Korea for the purchase of telecommunication equipment from the Western Electric Company. The U.S. passed up the chance to hold up the loan and show strong disapproval.

South Koreans denounced the visit to Seoul by the U.S. Export-Import Bank President for promising funds to Chon just two weeks after his military crackdown on May 17. They are critical of the visit of 160 businessmen in early June, saying that "It's your economic interests, not ours, they're concerned about."

A particular mention must be made of one example which illustrates the decision of Carter to abandon Kim Dae Jung in favor of a second Pak. On June 2, in a TV interview, Carter declared that ties with Seoul could not be severed simply on the grounds of human rights violations and reaffirmed that security considerations transcend human rights issues. To Washington, the security considerations mean the availability of south Korea as their continuing military base and colony. Therefore, it makes no difference whether south Korea goes dictatorial or democratic.

The democratic figures and particularly Kim Dae Jung strongly opposed Carter's visit to Seoul in July last year because it would encourage the slain Pak Jung Hi to crack down on the people advancing toward the restoration of democracy and freedom in south Korea. Carter, defying the strong demand of the south Korean democrats, took a trip to Seoul in order to shore up the Pak Jung Hi regime.

In south Korea he lost the support of Kim Dae Jung and many other pro-American democrats. Kim Dae Jung denounced the Carter visit as a telling blow at the democratic movement.

The south Korean democrats censured the Carter administration for actively backing the "yusin" remnants to maintain the Pak dictatorship without Pak Jung Hi, inssuing on Nov. 24 last year a statement saying that the outside forces must discontinue such speeches and acts which give an impression of support to the "yusin" remnants and cooperation in the intrigues seeking the prolongation of the "yusin" dictatorship.

The "National Federation for Democracy and National Unification" on May 26 made public a statement and denounced the U.S., saying:

"Why does the U.S. help Chon kill and wound innocent people? The U.S. should listen to the real cries of citizens and students." This is a cry shared by all the south Korean people.

Anti-Americanism is now growing in south Korea because the U.S. consistently sheltered the dictators for more than 30 years.

Concerning the feeling of the south Korean people against Americans, a specialist on Korea at the School of International Studies at the University of Washington said:

The enormous U.S. involvement in the regime of Pak/Chon also created a subterranean anti-Americanism in that country. In south Korea, the degree of American hatred remains pervasive but still largely unspoken in public, given that it is a crime to condemn the United States or call for withdrawal of U.S. troops. In private, however, the opposition is stringingly critical of the U.S. role in south Korea, especially regarding U.S. acquiescence to the latest military coup and the army's crackdown in Kwangju.

In south Korea, the anti-American stems from the popular perception that the United States is the chief obstacle to self-determination. In south Korea, it means being an obstacle to independence and the reunification of Korea.

While the reunification issue is rarely discussed in the Western or government-controlled Korean press, it remains a powerful undercurrent in both halves of Korea, a nation that until three decades ago had been united for a millennium. The North's frequent condemnation of dependence on foreign forces and support for self-reliance strikes a resonant chord throughout the country. South Korean opposition activists believe, and privately assert, that the United States stands in the way of the two halves joining again.

(Continued from page 1)

Hwan, joined in protesting the trial.

"We refuse to accept this trial," said the Rev. Mun, south Korea's leading scholar on the New Testament. Hi is one of the 23 dissidents indicted along with Kim.

The clergyman said the defendants had worked hard to bring democracy to south Korea, a nation where the military are in charge, and the trial was unfair.

"This is a political trial and just a formality trying to justify the political trial," he said, before the judge advocate stopped him from continuing his speech.

The prosecuters questioned Kim about his activities in the United States and Japan during his stay in those two countries from October 1972 until August 1973, when KCIA agents kidnapped him from a Tokyo hotel and dragged him back to south Korea.

Kim's activities after the assassination last October of Pak Jung Hi, were also questioned.

Relatives of most defendants apparently are boycotting the trial.

Only about eight family members of the defendants attended the afternoon session, leaving many empty seats in the courtroom. When reporters attempted to talk to them, plainclothesmen prevented contact.

Martial law troopers guard mass-arrested demonstrators on May 27 in Kwangju where mass fratricide was committed.

Korea Focus

Disciple Outshines His Master

It is wrong to conclude that Gen. Chon is as tyrannical as Syngman Rhee and Pak Jung Hi. An Asian saying goes, "A disciple outshines his master." Gen. Chon received military training while Sygnman Rhee was in power and found favor with Pak Jung Hi. He has now established himself as top ruler in south Korea. He is a military dictator different in quality from his mentor and master Pak and Rhee.

Gen. Chon, speaking at the ceremony marking his retirement from the army, dared to criticize the long rule of Pak Jung Hi. His point is that Pak's dictatorship was far from dictatorial and ruined the country. He said, "...abuses and moral deficiencies accompanying long rule do not create new history and new order, but only cause decay in a bog of conservatism." He was right when he blasted the "abuses and moral deficiencies" of Pak's junta, but his attack was designed to cover up his role in the Kwangju massacre and other crimes which now won him notoriety as "slaughterer." He is abusing his status to trample democracy.

What does his reference to "new history and new order" mean? His crackdown is not only on democratic forces including Kim Dae Jung but also on close associates of Pak Jung Hi who formed the leadership of the old "yusin" regime. Pak called his May 16, 1961 coup "a revolution" and executed "Minjok Ilbo" President Cho Yung Ju and Socialist Mass Party leader Choe Bak Kun and other progressive democratic leaders, who were supposed to carry out a genuine revolution serving the masses of people. Leading officials of the John Chang Myon regime and executives of the Democratic Party (the predecessor of the New Democratic Party) were temporarily fired but were allowed to join the "new government" of Pak after they swore to repent and redress their past mistakes. The then "President" Yun Po Son contested with Pak Jung Hi for the Blue House. The Chang regime and the Pak regime can be put in the same category of conservative capitalism, regardless of their difference: the former was a little bit democratic and the latter fascistic.

The conduct of Chon Du Hwan is different. As he confessed, Chon is not well informed of politics. Therefore, his political view is a reprint of that of Pak's. For example, he cites as his goal "a form of democracy fit for Korea's reality," "independent nationalism not dependent on foreign countries" and "construction of a welfare state." His slogans have no substance. He has at his command firm instruments whereby to put into practice his avowed "policy" objectives–entirely wrong. He outlined his idea of "new order" by avowing to revise the political map, including the liquidation of professional politicians. According to the August 16 Dong-A Ilbo, "a new generation is undertaking a reorganization of the political forces by the elimination of all the existing politicians. In short, Chon Du Hwan is ousting all those that were educated in Western democracy and forming a new political force with those trained in "yusin" dictatorship in a bid to write a new political map.

The victims of Chon's "new policy" platform are both opponents and proponents of "yusin." They include Kim Dae Jung and democratic Opposition leaders who consistently opposed the old "yusin" regime and were sensitive to its continuation and Kim Jong Pil, Li Hu Pak, Pak Jong Gyu, key figures of the "yusin" regime and former Cabinet members–Ku Ja Chun, Ko Jae Il, Kim Hyun Ok, Kim Royng Tae, Sin Hyong Sik–and foremer floor leader and secretary general of the ruling Democratic-Republican Party–Kil Jon Sik, Chang Yong Sun, and Hyun O Bong. Kim Dae Jung, Kim Yong Sam and Kim Jong Pil, widely known as "three Kims," were all sacked. The purge of nearly 10,000 public employee and journalists is part of such policy conduct. The resignation of Choi Gyu Ha as "President" is also its extension. Chon Du Hwan is doing what either Sygnman Rhee and Pak Jung Hi could not: "a revolutionary purge." In this sense, the court-martial will likely condemn Kim Dae Jung to death.

No matter what outrages he may commit, his regime cannot last long. He has made too many foes. The popular struggle for democracy gained momentum in the wake of the October 26 affair and in particular in the March-May period of this year but suffered setbacks in face of the savagely suppressed by Chon. None of the popular demands have been met, leaving the old issues unsolved, seeds of a new campaign. The main forces of the struggle have not been totally eliminated. With the reopening of schools, students will regroup and regain their strength not quickly but steadily, with their tacts becoming more sophisticated. Many of student and democratic dissident leaders are still at large, through prizes are offered for any information leading to their arrest. All the weapons have not been recovered in Kwangju, with many students escaping with firearms. Obviously, sooner or later, they will launch an underground struggle. A large number of old regime people have been converted to anti-Chonism because of the purge. The recklessness with which Chon hurriedly tried to consolidate his power is to cause his own ruin.

The most potential enemy is the anti-American climate which is being fast spawned in south Korea, once the sole area where anti-American backlashes were not anticipated. There is growing skepticism of the oft-reiterated allegations about the "threat from the north." Both Washington and Tokyo find it embarrassing to openly associate themselves with the Chon junta which they actually support. This situation resembles that during a few years prior to the death of Pak Jung Hi in which the Americans and the Japanese felt reluctance in giving public support to his regime.

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